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SUMMARY 
 
The master degree final project deals with Embedded Operating System blended with Security 
Solution for a Wireless Cellular IoT System. In this thesis, the new cellular standards like Narrow 
Band IoT and LTE Cat M which will replace the available GSM communication technology are 
analysed. In the next decade, there are more number of devices which are connected through cellular 
system. In this project, initially evaluate the MBED OS using MPS2+ prototyping board and measure 
the performance analysis like memory, heap, stack. Also perform MBED with TrustZone operations 
and system performance. On the security side trust zone is to be investigated to see if it is suitable to 
be used in cellular IoT system. The outcome would be to understand how a cellular IoT system would 
be affected in the relation to adding this trust zone features. 
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SANTRAUKA 
 
Šis baigiamasis projektas magistro laipsniui apginti yra skirtas įterptinių operacijų sistemų 
ir saugos sprendimų bevielėms korinio ryšio daiktų internet sistemoms tyrimui. Tezėse nagrinėjami 
nauji standartai, tokie kaip siaurajuostis IoT (angl. Narrow Band IoT) ir LTE Cat M, kurie tikimasi 
pakeis šiuo metu naudojamus GSM komunikacijų standartus. Prognozuojama, kad aseinenti 
dešimtmetį vis daugės įrenginių prijungtų per korines sistemas. Šiame projekte, MBED operacijų 
sistemos našumo analizė, apimanti atminties, dinaminės atminties (angl. Heap), dėklo (angl. stack) 
dydziy priklausomybių nuo aparatinių ir programinių modulių panaudojimo, atlikta naudojant 
MPS2+ prototipavimo plokštę. Taip pat atlikti MBED ir TrustZone operacijų sistemų našumo. 
Saugos funkcijų realizavimo TrustZone posisteme yra analizuoja, siekiant nustatyti jos tinkamumą 
korinio ryšio daiktų interneto sistemų kūrimui. Tuo siekiama nustatyti, kaip korinio ryšio daiktų 
interneto sistema yra įtakojama TrustZone posistemės savybių.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The mobile ecosystem is the developing technology in Internet of Things field. The cellular 
systems are driven by the internet of things. The world leading organization CISCO that estimates 
nearly 30 billion devices should be connected by cellular IoT in 2025. The technologies used in 
cellular systems are 2G, 3G, and 4G for the internet of things. These are not specifically for IoT and 
also for Low Power Wide Area Network. The cellular IoT that provides many services, including 
utility meters, medical, machines, and automotive fields. Long Term Evolutions required enhanced 
services to enable the device in the network with more lifetime, improving coverage area, the large 
number of supported devices and low deployment cost. The network needs very simple and less 
number of devices to work. Rural area networks that required extended coverage in transmission and 
the higher layer protocols which help to consume less power by achieving long life over a decade to 
the device. 
Today LTE supports internet of thing with so-called Cat 1 device, for utilizing coverage and 
massive devices should be connected to the technologies. The enhanced Machine Type 
Communication referred as NB-IoT and LTE-M. The data rates should be scalable for all the systems. 
The solutions can be increased in spectrum together with LTE. The bandwidth in GSM carrier as 
narrow for NB-IoT. Remaining networks are legacy cellular networks. The networks are updated with 
software to get a long life of the device, more coverage and low cost along with spectrum benefits. 
The internet of things device is interconnected to exchange data between them. The system will bring 
huge improvements in user experience and efficiency. The total IoT domain that estimates a large 
number of devices are connected to the network.  The most usage connections are fixed and short-
range communications. It will significantly for all connections expected through cellular IoT. 
The ARM develops NB-IoT system by using Core-Link SSE 200 IoT subsystem. It is the 
fastest way to create secure IoT chips, which integrates the core components of your system. Security 
in embedded systems with all components should take a large amount of time and effort. But Core-
Link SSE 200 IoT subsystem makes the processor become easier. It contains two core structures and 
features for IoT chips. Thus, it consists of two Cortex M33 ARM v8 processors and trust zone with 
crypto security for implementing a secure solution. The internet of things devices needs an operating 
system to perform the task scheduled in it. So, that it makes the system more efficient. The embedded 
system devices support a lot of operating systems, particularly internet of things devices demands 
high configured and exact platform operating systems.  
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The devices that are connected to the networks need to secure the internet of things systems. 
ARM trust zone technology is a system on chip and system-wide approach to security. Hardware-
based security that provides secure end points and trusted device root. The secure and non-secure 
methods are done by Trustzone on a system on chip. Trust zone in cellular IoT comes with trust 
opportunity. It built into the number of connected devices in LPWAN, we ensure that the data is 
secure and scalable. This operating system and security in an IoT device make the system very 
effective. Thus, the NB IoT using core link SSE 200 subsystem along with ARM CORDIO Radio 
core IP obtains best cellular IoT network with security solutions in the wireless system. Core link 
SSE 200 subsystem is the developing system in an internet of things field. By comparing with other 
devices, it will become more professional and cost effective. Figure 1 shows billions of devices are 
connected through cellular IoT in the next decade. It describes the fixed and short-range 
communications will be increase gradually. 
 
Figure 1 Billion global connections, 2015 – 2025 [1]  
Research Objective 
The main objectives of this thesis are, 
A. To investigate/evaluate/research/study of MBED operating system. 
B. To evaluate Trustzone security solution along with MBED OS for a wireless cellular system. 
In this project, the wireless cellular IoT system considered as a target. 
The tasks to be carried out for this thesis includes: 
1. Investigating MBED OS as RTOS and to research the possibilities of enabling MBED OS on 
ARMv8 Cortex-M architecture, which is on the latest available processor like Cortex M33. 
Cortex M33 has properties for trust zone, where both MBED OS and trust zone will be 
implemented on same cortex M33. To estimate the properties like performance, memory 
consumption and stack usage will be investigated to get an understanding of new RTOS in 
cellular IoT system. 
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2. On the security side, trust zone will be implemented on ARM cortex M33 and analysed to see 
if it is suitable for cellular IoT system. Properties like hardware impact, software impact, 
performance on security related parts will be investigated. 
The main goal of this thesis is to evaluate MBED OS with trust zone for security solution in the 
cellular IoT system.  
Thesis Structure 
This thesis structure contains five chapters, all the chapters will describe the project in detail.  
To target the above-mentioned goal, the following chapters must be achieved. 
Initially, an introduction of cellular it is discussed which includes the goal and the structure of the 
thesis. This gives an overview representation of embedded OS and trust zone technology. 
Chapter 1 mainly discusses related work reviews which may include the existing system developed 
in the early days and the mythological investigation for the security solutions with standard IoT 
protocols application in cellular IoT. 
Chapter 2 gives a brief description of MBED OS and the trust zone security solution which is 
including structure and replacement of current Cellular IoT system. In addition, this chapter describes 
Trustzone for a cellular network. 
Chapter 3 discusses various methods, and testing of different operating system with trust zone. This 
chapter concludes the impact of trust zone on MBED operating system.  
Finally, giving a brief note on the conclusion and suggestions for implementation of MBED OS linked 
with trust zone as security solution that satisfies the requirements of the Narrow Band IoT system. 
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1 RELATED WORK REVIEWS  
In this literature survey, the basic process involved in cellular IoT and the trust zone security 
have been outlined. The basic ideas of embedded operating system and security solution for internet 
of things have been discussed. In conclusion of this section, the reasons for MBED OS and security 
solution of trust zone and comparison of their results have been discussed.  
1.1 Cellular IoT 
Popularity of IoT devices has guide to the rise of low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) 
options such as 6LowPAN and LoRa. Traditional cellular networks consume more energy. It can able 
to transmit small of data occasionally.  
LTE Machine Type Communication (CAT 0, CAT 1, CAT M1) 
From 3GPP Release 8, several categories of user equipment are available. The lowest 
performance is called CAT 1 which is LTE category, that means it gives both duplex methods. It is 
fully commercial and used in many internet of things deployments. In 3GPP Release 12, user 
equipment of CAT 0 is specified to reduce device complexity. It supports simplifications such as 
operating device with one receiver chain, allowing half duplex and minimize peak rate. This category 
is in limited commercial availability. In 3GPP Release 13, CAT M1 having three objectives. They 
are reducing complexity from CAT 0 with increased coverage area and improved battery life. The 
main thing of CAT M1 is the reduction in cost from CAT 0 with reduced bandwidth to six physical 
resource blocks and referred to bandwidth limited. Due to this limitation, a new control channel and 
frequency hopping mechanism were specified. However, legacy LTE signalling broadcast for system 
information is sent in six physical resource blocks. These channels did not need to be re broadcast for 
CAT M1 user equipment, thus it reduces signal overhead. CAT M1 allows an extended battery life 
of more than decade for wide range of communications. Even with complexity reduction, CAT M1 
still provide many features to LTE, such as connected mode mobility and hand offs, frequency packets 
are in scheduled through semi persistent scheduling, and low latency packet while in connection. 
These are all the features for CAT M1 equipment to voice in internet of things application in coverage 
mode. Cat M1 targeting LPWA applications where small amount of data transfer is required. For 
example, smart metering that communicates with small amount of data. It simply needs to upload 
new software for the devices to operate within its LTE network.   
NB-IoT/Cat-M2 NB-IoT is also known as CAT M2 which has similar goal to Cat-M, but it uses a 
different technology. NB-IoT is potentially less expensive which eliminates the extra gateways, so it 
is hyped. Main server connects sensor gateway for the communication purpose. This advantage makes 
the networks efficiency, so that the bigger companies like Qualcomm, Ericsson are trying to achieve 
commercialize NB-IoT [2]. 
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EC-GSM it is an improved network, where the protocol in GSM network can be used by 80% of 
smart phones universally [2]. It can be positioned in available GSM networks. Leading network 
companies have completed trials of extended communication earlier, but still it doesn’t generate as 
much buzz as NB-IoT 
Table 1 Comparison of Cellular IoT Systems [1]  
Parameters LTE Rel-8 
Cat-1 
LTE Rel-12 
Cat-0 
LTE Rel-13 
Cat-M1 
NB-IoT  
Rel-13 
EC-GSM-
IoT Rel-13 
DL peak rate 10 Mbps 1 Mbps 1 Mbps ~0.2 Mbps ~0.5 Mbps 
UL peak rate 5 Mbps 1 Mbps 1 Mbps ~0.2 Mbps ~0.5 Mbps 
Duplex mode Full Half or Full Half or Full Half Half 
UE bandwidth 20 MHz 20 MHz 1.4 MHz 0.18 MHz 0.2MHz 
Max transmit 
power 
23 dBm 23 dBm 20 or 23 dBm 23 dbm 23 or 33 dBm 
Relative modem 
complexity 
100% 50% 20-25% 10% Not evaluated 
 
1.2 Survey of Embedded Operating Systems for the IoT Environment 
Internet of things environment can be performed based on the operating system contain in IoT 
devices. Therefore, the operating systems analyse each process that occurs in the systems. Operating 
systems helps to run the services to other applications in the system. The programs provide 
functionality that the user of the computer needs. The operating systems provide services to make 
application faster, easier and sustainable. Most operating systems performs multi-tasking. The 
scheduler in operating system that responsible for selecting program to run and execute by rapid 
switching between the processor and kernel. The scheduler in real time operating system is designed 
to provide excepted execution pattern. This assurance meet real time requirements can only be made 
in the scheduler of operating system behaviour [3]. There are many existing embedded operating 
systems are available.  The operating system classifies and controls the hardware and it is that piece 
of software that turns hardware into computing tool. The main task of operating systems defines the 
functionality of process processor management which ensuring that each process and applications 
receives enough of the processor function time, using maximum processor cycles for work and switch 
between processes in multi threads. Memory management includes enough memory for each process 
to execute and use different types of memory in the system. Device management manages all 
hardware not on motherboard through driver programs. Driver provides applications for hardware 
without having to know details of hardware.  
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Application program interfaces uses functions of computer and operating system without 
having track of all details mainly CPU operation. Providing common user interface brings formal 
structure to the interaction between user and the computer. Real Time computing operating system 
should have features to support this critical requirement to reduce it. The RTOS should have certain 
behaviour to unpredictable events. A good RTOS should bounded under all system load scenario.  
1.2.1 Contiki OS 
Contiki is open source operating system that connects microcontroller to the internet of things. 
It makes application that should be efficient use of hardware platforms. Contiki is used in many 
systems. It has some standards for internet and developments. It supports both internet protocol fully 
along with wireless standards. It has rapid development in IDE simulator. The main features of 
Contiki OS are memory allocation for tiny systems, IP networking with standard IP protocols such 
as UDP, TCP and HTTP, module loading for loading and linking of modules at run time, protothreads 
to save memory and provide flow control and build systems makes it easy compile for any available 
Contiki platforms.  
1.2.2 Apache Mynewt OS 
Aache Mynewt is a real-time operating system that needs to perform for a long-time memory 
and other constrictions to the IoT devices. It gives a complete system for prototyping, managing and 
development. Microcontroller environments have number of characteristics that makes unique system. 
It has low memory footprint in the system range, reduced code size from 64-128KB to 16-32MB. 
Processing speeds of operating system is low and conserve maximum power usage. It will become 
more complex when more number of devices are connected. To perform many functions, it should 
have networking stacks, peripherals, and scheduled process. Benefits of using this operating system 
helps developers from other application code being written. It provides features to create complete 
operating system for controlled devices. Apache mynewt OS contains scheduler, time and tasks, 
semaphore, mutex, memory pools and heap.  
1.2.3 RIOT OS 
RIOT OS helps at bridging the gap we observed for sensor networks and traditional fledged 
running on host. It is based on objectives including efficiency, memory footprint, and API access, of 
hardware. RIOT implements kernel that supports multi-threading. The main features of RIOT make 
it robust against error in single components. It allows developers to create many threads and 
distributed systems can be implemented by kernel API. The amount of threads is only limited by 
memory and stack size for each thread. The requirements for real time process ensure RIOT constant 
periods for kernel tasks like scheduler run and timing operations. The runtimes of OS are exclusive 
use of static memory in kernel. RIOT switching context performs two cases [4]. 
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From the above operating systems, they are all performed in all embedded devices without any 
security. The embedded devices for NB-IoT needs operating system with security solution. So the 
security and operating system will combine each other. 
1.3 Internet of Things Security 
A device that is connected to data communication networks needs security. Thus, the internet 
of things security gives safeguard to all connected devices. IoT involves objects provided with unique 
identifiers and ability to transfer data over a network. 
1.3.1 Embedded Security for IoT 
Internet of things imposes abnormal restrictions of computational power, connectivity, energy 
and number of devices which makes difference from authorized policy of security in distributed 
systems. To overcome the problem of security in internet domain that form ubiquity in IoT domain 
which are vulnerable to security attacks. In this work, embedded security required solution to resist 
different attacks and temper proofing of devices by concept of computing trusted platform. This issue 
addresses problems in hardware platform. Our work also partially helps in addressing securing data 
in transit [5]. 
1.3.2 Security threats against IoT embedded devices and systems 
Security and privacy are two main challenges of the IoT, particularly due to the emerging 
threats embedded devices face due to their unique limitations in terms of connectivity, computational 
power and energy budget. Providing secure communications among M2M devices over cellular 
networks are an emerging research area, with divergent approaches being adopted. On one hand, 
efforts aim to secure the device itself and, on the other hand, network/provider-based architectures 
that benefit from the existing authentication methods of a cellular telecom operator are being 
proposed. In parallel, privacy is increasingly becoming one of the major concerns in these kinds of 
systems, especially given the surge of applications handling critical information. This is a particularly 
crucial area in certain IoT system categories, such as the case of network-enabled medical 
environments [6]. 
1.3.3 IoT security impacts on mobile networks 
From the security and privacy of IoT devices, the deployment of M2M wireless system on 
mobile networks also having important security implication on the networks itself. The cellular 
network has big challenge to provide resource allocation for embedded devices in mobile 
infrastructures. Beyond the network operation challenge under such a large load of IoT traffic, M2M 
traffic is considered as one of the main factors within the overall LTE network security framework. 
Industry and standardization forums defining the main security threats and requirements for mobile 
network security are indeed, highlighting the IoT and its potential impact [6]. 
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1.3.4 Trusted computing blocks for embedded Linux-based ARM Trustzone Platforms 
Embedded security is an emerging topic in the field of mobile. Mobile trusted modules with 
trusted computing has outlined possible approach to mobile platform security. The TCG is a platform 
independent approach to trusted computing explicitly allowing for a wide range of implementations. 
Extending platforms to hardware with ARM support TrustZone security mechanism. ARM follows 
different approach to platform security to build embedded trusted computing platform [33]. 
1.3.5 ARM TrustZone Devices in Restricted Spaces 
Some devices equipped with wide range of peripheral can potentially be misused in various 
environments. They can be used to get sensitive information from other sources. One way to prevent 
these situations to regulate smart devices in restricted spaces. ARM Trustzone in restricted space 
hosts use memory operations to analyse and regulate devices within the space. It shows that 
TrustZone to obtain strong security for small trusted computing base to execute on guest device [34].  
1.4 Problem Analysis in Existing Methods 
 
Figure 2 Trustzone without operating system 
From the above survey, OS for IoT environment are well equipped with major networks and 
communication protocols, security features as well as optimized for efficient usage of computing 
power in constraint environment. The operating system does not have any secure information. So, 
embedded systems need security solution for Trustzone implementation. But in the embedded Linux 
based on arm completes simple security on operating system. In ARM-FreeRTOS of IoT platform 
they developed operating system between user and network without any security solutions. It 
explained communication between two nodes/paths. Security and privacy on embedded system 
explained about the emerging of connectivity and energy. This needs a crucial environment for 
Trustzone in cellular networks. IoT impact realize that connectivity between any nodes should have 
secure path to exchange data or communication. Overall cellular system requires better operating 
region in embedded system with secure zone. 
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To get a better network we need to find performance based systems and memory allocation of the 
embedded device. Trustzone is developed on hardware by ARM, that is built in system on chip 
semiconductor which gives secure end points on the trusted root.  
1.5 Proposed System 
 
Figure 3 Embedded Operating System with TrustZone 
Cellular IoT is an emerging technology that will have a huge impact on the world in many 
aspects. In an older technology, cellular networks do not have any special requirements like coverage, 
bandwidth, lower power consumption, cost and linear functionality. The newer outcome of NB-IoT 
in cellular networks will overcome the disabilities. Thus, it supports on bandwidth, spectrum and 
maximum data rates in the IoT network. LTE M that supports both frequency and time division duplex 
modes. Therefore, problems in older methods are performance, bandwidth and duplex methods can 
be reduced by enhanced machine type communication and narrowband internet of things.  
ARM has software tool to make IoT deployment faster and easier, so called MBED IoT device 
platform. It is primarily MBED operating system built open standards, that claims security and 
standards based manageability in single tool. MBED OS that supports cortex M processor based 
devices. It will support standards such as cellular technologies, thread, 6LowPAN and other protocols. 
It acts as bridge between protocol and APIs for IoT devices. Improved efficiency and security are 
available in MBED device server. MBED OS can be implemented on Cortex M33 by using CMSIS 
RTX 5 kernel. The main reason for choosing MBED operating system is due to energy efficiency, 
RAM requirements, memory footprint and security. These are explaining how it is suitable for narrow 
band internet of things in Core Link SSE 200 IoT subsystem with Trustzone.  
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2 METHODOLOGIAL INVESTIGATION OF MBED OS LINKED WITH 
TRUSTZONE FOR SECURITY SOLUTIONS  
The latest cellular standard is Narrow Band IoT (NB-IoT) mainly for Long Term Evolution 
(LTE). Long and wide range cellular systems are connected by Narrow Band IoT which has Low 
Power Wide Area Network technology. It is mainly designed for the Internet of Things. Cellular IoT 
technology is standardized by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). NB-IoT is specifically 
designed for large number of connected devices, low power consumption and low cost. In this 
proposed system, NB-IoT can be implemented in Core-Link SSE 200 IoT sub-system. IoT sub system 
can be done with V2M-MPS2+ board. The board contains Cortex M prototyping system, which is 
mainly designed for evaluation and prototyping of ARM v8 architecture. The MBED OS that only 
supports on Cortex M series like M0, M0+, M3, M4, M7. Also, ARM develops cortex M23 and M33 
for security purposes.  
The focus of this project is to implement MBED OS on Cortex M Prototyping Board. The 
board that initially build with Cortex M series in it, the MBED OS performance can be evaluated on 
Cortex M33. The Cortex M33 is implemented on V2M-MPS2+ board utilizing FPGA configuration. 
This makes that cortex M prototyping board will act with CM33 processor. ARM Keil provides the 
software pack for CMSIS RTOS to build kernel in CM33. This includes software components to 
development tools. Source modules, config files, user code templates and header are available in 
software components. Using kernel, we can develop MBED OS with corresponding drivers, 
peripherals, and secure connectivity.  
The CMSIS defines generic tools interfaces and hardware abstraction layer for Cortex M 
processors. The CMSIS is intended to establish the software combination from multiple vendors. It 
supports ARMv8 architecture including trust-zone for hardware security extensions and CM23 and 
CM33 processors. The CMSIS contains CMSIS core which provide standardized interface for cortex 
M processor core and peripherals. CMSIS peripherals driver’s interfaces for supported devices. The 
application peripheral interface in RTOS that connects the peripherals in microcontroller that 
implements for system stack and user interfaces. DSP library available in CMSIS for all cortex M 
cores, which implements all instruction sets available for M4, M7 and M33. Core implements the run 
time system for Cortex M devices that gives access to the core and devices by the user.  
ARM MBED OS is a popular open source embedded operating system, which is released 
under Apache 2.0 license. It is designed mainly for things to be connected to internet or cloud. For 
the MBED OS component, the OS is a lightweight, low-power kit OS structured to run on Cortex-M 
processors. ARM for their part shapes necessary hardware features and even some common libraries, 
with an aim on offering building blocks for developers looking to design scalable products. 
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2.1 Hardware Description – V2M MPS2+ board 
It can be noted that both MBED operating system and Trustzone are implemented on ARM 
Cortex M prototyping system (V2M MPS2+). It is mainly designed for Cortex M processors 
prototyping and evaluation purposes. The system includes latest cortex M7 processor with cheap 
motherboard. It provides useful peripherals with encrypted FPGA for all Cortex M processors. In this 
system cortex M33 can be implemented using IoT kit image file. Thus, the prototyping system with 
FPGA will act as cortex M33 processor. Using IoTkit_CM33_FP Keil pack we can configured 
peripherals for the design. It is an ideal platform used for FPGA prototyping and evaluation of the 
operating systems. Additionally, this hardware board has a functionality of going back to previous 
ARM Cortex series especially ARM cortex M4 by basic booting process, thereby MPS2+ purely 
provides great support for ARM Cortex M processors. MBED OS is performed by using CMSIS RTX 
v5 kernel. RTX kernel having some functions in run time environment with kernel configuration that 
describes running task, systick timer as kernel timer, clock and round robin switching methods. RTX 
kernel functions that runs and execute main thread, it has some external function to initialize kernel 
and suspend the kernel. Both initialize, running and suspend are performed under main function. 
Thus, the threads are decelerated with some attributions, otherwise it will take as default value. 
2.2 Introduction to MBED OS 
The MBED OS is an operating system for the IoT devices. It is mainly designed for low cost 
energy environment, connectivity, security, and device management that required by IoT devices. It 
gives application framework for development and supports for all standard connectivity. The MBED 
OS is an operating system mainly created for MBED enabled devices. It allows the application to 
control the hardware of the boards by providing APIs. MBED OS intended specifically for controlled 
devices, the hardware and networks which are limited resources that works automatically behind the 
system.  
The single thread, hardware abstract and OS efficiency that manages power and schedules 
tasks, manages device, and securing communication by using MBED OS uvisor and MBED TLS 
supports multiple networking options. The MBED OS core provides application portability through 
kernel and hardware abstraction layer. MBED connectivity develops APIs to increase portability and 
productivity of the device. This connectivity implements choice of low level communication stack. 
For comprehensive lifecycle, device communication and security framework can be performed by 
MBED security. The MBED tools manage configuration, built and testing. 
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Figure 4 MBED OS Stack [7] 
2.2.1 OS Platform requirements 
It requires mainly connectivity, security, and management for the embedded systems. IoT 
products requires device management services which will become device essential components with 
platform OS.  
1. To accelerate the development of IoT devices that needs pre-integrated to all necessary 
connectivity and software components which provide across many hardware solutions, 
modern development methodologies, choice to microcontroller units and to improve 
productivity. It provides operating system components and application peripherals across 
many vendor solutions.   
2. The deployment of IoT devices providing standard connectivity to difference transports 
and manage cloud to open opportunities and minimize cost Solve the device management 
problem to deployment of the IoT devices.  
3. Ecosystem scale provide maximum gearing and pace in IoT platform. Open source to 
remove barriers, collaboration with partners to provide maximum gearing of investment 
for everyone. 
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Figure 5 MBED OS platform for internet of things [8] 
2.2.2 MBED OS Core 
MBED OS core enables application and component libraries to work unchanged across 
microcontroller units. It provides portability for developers. Consistent boot and C/C++ runtime 
across microcontroller units includes support over different toolchains and standard library 
integrations. RTOS kernel is built on the established, widely used and open source CMSIS RTOS 
RTX. Memory devices optimized small kernel. Common peripheral driver APIs for supported across 
all MCUs. It is helpful to start up and initialization, memory maps and cross toolchain integration. In 
MBED OS core defines that initially start up with boot CMSIS with corresponding runtime events to 
the networking. In figure 6 the OS core layer defines the events, threads and CMSIS RTOS RTX of 
the MBED OS. 
 
Figure 6 MBED OS core layers [8] 
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2.3 Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS) 
Cortex M processor series are supported by hardware abstraction layer given by CMSIS Keil 
pack which describes tool interfaces. It offers device affordability and software connection to the 
peripherals, software reusability to the processors for effortless learning in microcontroller develops 
and save time for latest devices. Figure 7 shows CMSIS structure, it describes the components as 
follows. In this project, the latest version of CMSIS v5 which is suitable for ARM v8 M architecture 
(Cortex M33) and Trustzone for ARMv8-M hardware security solutions, which is other main part of 
the project. CMSIS is described with different silicon vendors and provides unique decision for 
peripherals to connect RTOS and middleware components [9]. 
 
Figure 7 CMSIS Structure [9] 
The CMSIS consists of main components as  
CMSIS core – This is a main part of the structure that includes APT for Cortex M processor core and 
its peripherals. It provides a standardized interface for Cortex M series as well as Single Input 
Multiple Output function for all Cortex M series. In this project, the CMSIS core operates a runtime 
system for Cortex M33 and Cortex M4 processor and allow accessibility to the core and the 
peripherals of the device. CMSIS core describe how the security extensions which are available in 
Cortex M33 processor. Thus, MBED OS will be implemented using kernel RTX 5 core. 
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CMSIS Driver – To enable connection between middleware peripheral driver for reusability through 
the devices. The microcontroller with middleware interfaces allows communication stacks, structures 
and file systems in RTOS API [9].  
CMSIS DSP – The DSP library with different data type for single precision and fixed floating points 
are defined by CMSIS DSP. The Cortex M processor access all library cores. It is stabilized for 
performance single instruction multiple data instructions are handled by ARM v7 M and ARM v8 M 
architectures [9].  
CMSIS DAP – Standard firmware for debug unit that connects to access port. It is distributed as 
package and will suitable for evaluation boards. Debug access port is provided as separate download.  
CMSIS-RTOS v2 – CMSIS RTOS2 is an upgrade version of CMSIS RTOS with kernel based 
operations in RTX. ARM v8 M suitable with dynamic object, binary enhanced interface between API 
compilers and multi core accessibility for system [9].  
2.3.1 Overview of CMSIS RTOS v2 
The CMSIS RTOS2 is common API interface mainly for Cortex M processor devices. It 
provides a standard API for software peripherals which needs functionality and provide dedicated 
benefits to the users. The middleware components need CMSIS RTOS2 to refer undecided RTOS 
and then will easy to adapt firmware structure. The source of microcontroller system handled by 
CMSIS RTOS to perform parallel thread operation concurrently. CMSIS RTOS2 perform several 
operations quickly and concurrently. Thread operations performs various task to reduce the program 
structure. The system is ascendable and more threads are summed rapidly, it executes high priority 
thread initially. The CMSIS RTOS2 gives several services in various application for periodical timer 
function with triggering and memory consumption with applications. 
The CMSIS-RTOS2 concentrates the following needs: 
1. CMSIS RTOS v2 does not need memory buffers for dynamic objects. It is optional for CMSIS 
RTOS 
2. Secure and non-secure modes are implement in ARM V8 M architecture 
3. Multi core systems allows to pass messages between two layers. 
4. CMSIS RTOS fully based on C++ run time environments.  
ARM Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS) motivate to provide a 
standardized API for software components. It enables standard project templates, stimulate 
middleware development, and simplify the usage of CMSIS DSP library.  It is used to simplifying 
programming models of cortex M devices. It provides signal protocols and middleware industry with 
standard RTOS APIs. Software ecosystem allows application sharing to the API design.  
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Figure 8 CMSIS RTOS API Structure [10] 
The CMSIS-RTOS API v2 is a generic RTOS interface for Cortex-M devices. CMSIS-
RTOS2 provides features that are required in many applications. Middleware components that use 
the CMSIS-RTOS API are RTOS agnostic. CMSIS-RTOS compliant middleware is easier to adapt. 
API design consideration is suitable for small memory foot print, scalable functionality, and multi-
processor systems. CMSIS RTOS that requires pre-emptive context switching with multiple priorities. 
It mainly required functionalities like mutex, semaphore, time management, queue, and event signal. 
Particularly message queue and mailing queue that works with interrupt signals.  
Features that allows generic wait function with support to time intervals. Zero mail queue is 
used to support multi-processor systems. Priority inversion is done using deterministic context 
switching and round robin context switching. CMSIS RTOS2 that preforms inter-process 
communications to exchange data between two or more separate independent threads. Operating 
system provide resources for inter process communication, such as message queues, semaphores, 
memory map, and time management. Inter process communications are programmed in high level of 
abstraction that gives application facilities to the distributed system. 
2.4 Functions defined within CMSIS RTOS v2  
MBED OS embedded operating system is implemented in cortex M prototyping system (V2M 
MPS2+). MBED OS is performed by using CMSIS RTX v5 kernel. RTX kernel having some 
functions in run time environment with kernel configuration that describes running task, systick timer 
as kernel timer, clock and round robin switching methods. RTX kernel functions that runs and execute 
main thread, it has some external function to initialize kernel and suspend the kernel. Both initialize, 
running and suspend are performed under main function. Thus, the threads are decelerated with some 
attributions, otherwise it will take as default value. 
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2.4.1 CMSIS RTOS Thread 
The threads have scheduling unit, it performs under some priority functions too. Thread will 
be generated by osThreadCreate() by defining with priority, instances, and stack size. Thread defines 
an object leaves it as not schedulable. It has some states like running, ready, waiting and inactive to 
perform declared function in that thread.  
• Running state execute only one thread at that time. 
• Running thread has terminated, the next thread in ready position with highest priority become 
running thread. 
• Waiting state that perform to wait event in thread functions. 
• Thread are not created in Inactive state. 
Thread priorities levels are osPriorityIdle, osPriorityLow, osPriorityBelowNormal, osPriorityNormal , 
osPriorityAboveNormal, osPriorityHigh, osPriorityRealTime.. The priority level is set when thread 
object defined. The thread priority level change be changed by osThreadSetPriority and 
osThreadGetPriority for new priority and return the current task priority. Thread states and transition 
function are shown in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Thread State and State Transition [11] 
2.4.2 CMSIS RTOS Semaphore 
Semaphore management function is used to protect and managed access to shared resources. 
It accesses to the group of identical peripherals which can be managed. Each time a semaphore token 
is obtained with osSemaphoreWait the semaphore count is decreased. The no token can be acquired, 
when the count is zero. Semaphores are released with osSemaphoreRelease functions which increase 
the count [12]. 
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Figure 10  CMSIS-RTOS Semaphore [12] 
2.4.3 CMSIS RTOS Mutex 
 
Figure 11 CMSIS-RTOS Mutex [13] 
For resource management, the operating systems can be done using mutual exclusion. 
Microcontroller devices having resources which may use often, but only one thread at time. Shared 
resources protected by using mutex function. It is created and then passed between the threads. Like 
semaphore mutex also contains token, it is special version of semaphore. Comparing to semaphore 
mutex perform only one thread at the time. Mutex having thread ownership thus it has token is in 
binary and bounded. When a thread acquires a mutex and becomes its owner, subsequent mutex 
acquires from that thread will succeed immediately without any latency [13]. 
2.5 Introduction to Trustzone 
Embedded system products require sensitive hardware, real time operation, less power and 
security protection. To accelerate the system design, the modern applications need security. The 
protection of assets requires device communication using crypto and authentication methods, 
firmware against IP theft, secret data such as personal information and operation to maintain services.  
Trustzone for ARM v8 M includes: 
• Secure and non-secure domain conserves low interrupt latency 
• The complexity of solution does not code overhead 
• The secure domain has minimal call instructions.  
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The confidential and integral part of system is developed by Trustzone. The processors 
application protects high value code of authentication and enterprise. On the application processor, it 
is used to provide security boundary for global platform environment. This is depicted on figure 12, 
where the processor family features contribute equal security approaches, but an entirely contrasting 
operation. Trustzone system offers a foundation for system-broad security and the development of a 
trusted platform. 
 
Figure 12 ARM Trustzone security concept [15] 
2.5.1 Programmer’s Model for ARM v8 M 
In the secure state, it accesses all the peripherals and the memory. The memory alias that 
mirrored all secure and non-secure peripherals in the system control and debug area. Secure code in 
secure region that access memory in both regions. The secure peripherals are assessable during 
program execution. The Security Attribution Unit configures non-secure memory, interrupt and 
peripheral access. A memory protection unit and system control block and systick are also available 
in secure state.  The two interrupt vectors for secure and non-secure supports system execution. This 
assignment is controlled during secure state execution through nested vector interrupt controller [14]. 
 
 
Figure 13 Secure Memory Map [14] 
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The memory view is same as cortex M memory map. It accesses to secure memory that 
triggers security exception in handler state. Code that from non-secure is executes in non-secure and 
only access memory in that region. The secure regions from non-secure code that is executed and 
security state of the system in fault exception. CMSIS core defines additional file that is used in secure 
attribution unit. 
 
 
Figure 14 Non-secure Memory Map [14] 
2.5.2 Registers 
 
Figure 15 Register in ARM v8 M [14] 
Above figure shows register view of ARM v8 M system, the general-purpose registers can be 
accessed from any state, callable function use registers for parameter and return values. R13 stack 
pointer register alias (PSP_NS, MSP_NS, PSP_S, MSP_S) accessed depends on state and mode of 
thread. Each stack pointer having optional limit registers for stack overflows.  
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The system has independent CONTROL register for both state. The interrupt control registers 
are banked between the states. The interrupt priority for the non-secure state can be lowered so that 
secure interrupt has always higher priority. The core registers of the current state are accessed using 
standard core registers functions. Registers are accessible in both secure and non-secure states [14]. 
Summary of Register 
In figure 15 the general-purpose registers are shown. Registers that perform different 
operations and functions in it. General-purpose registers for data operations can be done by using 
Registers from R0-R12. Stack pointer is in register R13, it is used to indicate CONTROL registers 
and having Main Stack Pointer (MSP) and Process Stack Pointer (PSP). For the security extension 
can be implemented using MSP_NS for Non-secure and MSP_S for secure state. Similarly, for PSP 
registers. Link Register is register R14 to stores return values form function calls. Register R15 is 
used for Program Counter contains address of program. Program Status Register is the combination 
of Application, Interrupt and Execution Registers. PRIMASK protect all exception with priority. For 
the security extension both non-secure and secure states are implemented. If it is not need means, 
CONTROL registers control in stack that used in Thread mode.  
2.5.3 Memory Map  
 
Figure 16 Memory map model [15] 
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Memory map of Trustzone boundaries is divided into 512MB. It adds security support by 
aliasing each boundary at intermediate point. The lower part access to 256MB non-secure state and 
the upper part provides secure state of 256MB. Each secure window and non-secure window are 
accessible through control points. The user could use 28-bit address to define secure and non-secure 
memory regions [15]. 
 
Table 2 ARM v8 M Default Memory Map [16] 
Address Region Region Name Memory Type Description 
0x00000000 - 
0x1FFFFFFF 
Code  Normal Typically, 
ROM/Flash 
vector table that 
is required for 
boot up 
0x20000000 - 
0x3FFFFFFF 
SRAM Normal On chip RAM 
0x40000000 - 
0x5FFFFFFF 
Peripheral Device On chip 
peripherals 
0x60000000 - 
0x9FFFFFFF 
RAM Normal Supports code 
0xA0000000 - 
0xDFFFFFFF 
Device Device Expansion 
memory 
0xE0000000 - 
0xE003FFFF 
PPB - NVIC, MPU and 
SAU registers 
0xE0040000 - 
0xE004FFFF 
Device Device ETM, MTB 
configuration 
registers 
0xE0050000 - 
0xE00EFFFF 
PPB - Reserved 
memory 
0xE00F0000 - 
0xE00FFFFF 
Device Device MCU ROM 
0xE0100000 - 
0xFFFFFFFF 
Vendor_SYS Device Core sight ROM 
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2.5.4 RTOS Thread Context Management 
To contribute a stable RTOS thread context management for TrustZone system based on 
ARMv8-M across the different RTOS, the CMSIS-CORE provides header file called as TZ_context.h 
including API definitions, which is picturized in figure 17 . A non-secure application adopts an RTOS 
and access library modules defined under secure mode needs an authority the secure stack area. It can 
be noted that RTOS which operates in non-secure mode don’t have permissions for accessing 
registers under Secure mode. Thus, Secure functions offers a consistent thread context switch. 
As the non-secure and secure mode parts of an application are splitted, the API for governing 
the secure stack area should be stabilized. If not the secure library modules automatically push an 
application under non – secure mode to adopt an identical RTOS implementation. It should be noted 
that to allocate the context memory for threads, an RTOS kernel that operates under non-secure mode 
calls the interface functions prescribed by the header file TZ_context.h. The TZ_context functions 
itself are sections of the application running under secure mode. A minimum implementation is 
offered as part of RTOS2 and needs to manage the secure stack for execution of the thread. But, there 
is also way to realise the context memory management system with supplementary features like 
access control to protect state memory regions using an MPU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 RTOS Thread Context Management for ARMv8-M TrustZone 
2.5.5 Trustzone Security Requirements 
In embedded system security can mean many different things which are not limited which is shown 
in figure 18. It requires the followings need, 
1. Communication protection which means protection of data transfers from being visible to 
unauthorized parties and other like cryptography. 
2. The data protection prevents data from third parties and that is stored inside the devices.  
3. firmware protection secures on chip from reverse engineering. 
4. Operation protection secures operations from threats. 
Non-Secure State 
RTOS (Non-secure part) 
- RTOS API functions 
- Scheduler with 
Systick handler 
- Resource handling 
for non-secure 
objects 
 
 
Secure State 
TZ_context (secure part) 
- Called only by 
RTOS_NS 
- Context switch to 
handle secure state 
registers 
- Manages thread stack 
(PSP_S) 
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5. Many security products are required protection mechanism of devise from being overridden.  
6. Firmware in secure memories are preloaded to prevent attacks. Trustzone technology for can also 
work with protection techniques. 
7. Critical operations of software can be preloaded to permit access from secure state. Thus, 
operations can be protected from non-secure state.  
8. Secure boot enables platform and it will boot from secure state. 
 
Figure 18 Trustzone Security address 
2.6 Security for IoT Devices 
 
Figure 19 Trustzone for IoT Devices 
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Figure 19 describes Trustzone technology also used for addition protection features in 
microcontroller that targeting internet of things products. The Cortex M33 microcontroller is 
developed for cellular IoT which include a long range of security features. The use of TrustZone can 
ensure that all features only accessed using APIs with entry points. To use Trustzone for safe guard 
security features user must prevent untrusted applications from directly accessing resources. Ensure 
reprogramed flash image for checking and prevent being from reverse engineered.  
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3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter explains about the results which are taken from Cortex M33 and Cortex M4 
processors using MBED OS. TrustZone with MBED OS On Cortex M33 performance can be 
discussed.  
3.1 Comparison of ARM v7 M and ARM v8 M Architecture 
It is focused to bring security and productivity on embedded applications in an IoT field. The 
architecture that reduces complexity and develops secure solutions that fits to SoCs. ARM v8 M is 
the successor of ARM v6 M and ARM v7 M. It adds fast, low overhead security in hardware. 
Breakpoints and watchpoints that enhance the trace flexibility. Product performance that improves 
solutions in memory protection unit. It has two sub profiles such as ARM v8 M Baseline and ARM 
v8 M Mainline. Baseline is used for power and area constrained devices. In addition, C11 atomic data 
types instructions enhance the system support. Mainline that is used for featured and capable 
applications. Trustzone for ARM v8 M optimised for affordable security, restriction to secure 
memory and I/O paths. Removing code in virtualization solution. It introduces secure gateway SG 
instructions where the domain call from the instruction.  
 
Figure 20 ARM v8 M structure 
ARM v8 M that supports Cortex M33 and ARM v7 M supports Cortex M4, where Cortex M33 is the 
successors of Cortex M4. Core-Link SSE 200 is compactable with M33 processor. The results that 
are compared between memory consumptions in both M4 and M33 processors by developing MBED 
OS. M33 gives all security solution with Trustzone and it is improved real time operations. The same 
process happened M4 without Trustzone isolation.  
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In Cortex M4 both operating systems are supported, but in Cortex M33 MBED OS supports easily. 
Cortex M33 performs with ARM CLANG Compiler. But Cortex M4 compile using ARM CC. In this 
project port file for M4 was developed by changing ARM CC to ARM CLANG compiler. 
3.1.1 Cortex M Processors 
 
Figure 21 Comparison between Cortex M processors [35] 
Cortex M33 is an application of ARM v8 M, it uses same debugging interface for all Cortex 
M processors. M33 offers wakeup interrupt controller and DSP/SMD instruction for low power 
devices. M4 having same DSP instruction. Both M4 and M33 has floating point unit which adds more 
instructions. AHB5 extend security and memory to the whole system.  Using memory protection 
specification can be setup in both regions. It should extend up to 480 interrupts. Embedded Trace 
Macro cell fits to the design. It buffers as option to trace memory instead of trace-out. Co-processor 
in M33 supports 8 co-processors. Hardware that check stack limit often. Trustzone gives secure 
isolation for whole system. The specifications of architecture of processor from debug points having 
instruction set, exception and program model, debug registers are defined by architecture 
specifications. ARM v8 architectures as 32 bit which is highly compatible with existing ARM v6 M 
and ARM v7 M to enable migration within Cortex M processor. 
3.2 Memory Management on MBED Operating System 
Memory management of an operating system manages primary memory and it process in main 
memory during execution. It keeps tracks of location, that check how much it consumes during 
process. It decides the process to get memory on time. MBED OS having memory allocation which 
are based on defined memory model. Memory allocation contributes many cases like pool allocation, 
heap allocation and extendable pools. 
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 In typical embedded system, there are four different kinds of memory like code, global data, 
heap and stack. Consequently, heap and stack area coordinated to fill equal section of memory. In 
MBED OS, we need two additional memory which are uvisor memory and free heap which are 
normally located in ROM.  
uVisor memory 
On Cortex M3/M4, initially it occupies small part of memory in RAM and the protected features. The 
uvisor protects space adoption in the microprocessor unit. 
Stack 
In the memory organization of MBED OS that contains stack at the bottom of memory. This address 
is selected absolutely since it permits stack overflows to be found easily. In Cortex M3 or Cortex M4 
memory management is regulated by uvisor which is initially permits by the stack handled by the 
uvisor memory. In Cortex M0 and M0+ will regulate hardfault. This permits application to rescue 
from stack overflows, normally via a reset.  
Global data 
Global Data is the conventional .bss and .data regions developed by the compiler. This size of this 
section is highly dependent upon application without any configuration. 
Heaps 
Never free heap and standard heap are the types of MBED OS. The data can be used by never free 
heap which is on the top of the address and memory pools are not to be freed. Sbrk function used 
standard heap which is on the bottom of the address. The core util module developed by trivial 
allocator for linear allocation and deallocation of memory. This memory allocations are lock free.  
 
Figure 22 Memory Organization in MBED OS 
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Table 3 Memory Model of MBED OS [21] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Simulation Results  
To implement MBED OS together with TrustZone for security solutions on NB-IoT, the 
thread analysis and experimental results were experimented on ARM Cortex M4 and ARM Cortex 
M33 processors.  These experiments are mainly done to verify the memory consumption on MBED 
OS to be linked with TrustZone, since memory plays major role on security reasons for NB-IoT. In 
addition, memory consumption is verified on both the processors (Cortex M4 and M33) to verify the 
stability of memory mainly on Cortex M33, since it has a property of TrustZone system rather than 
on ARM Cortex M4. 
Thread Analysis -  It is conducted to verify whether thread supports for MBED OS, as thread is 
important parameter for functioning different operations on RTX-5 kernel within CMSIS-RTOS2.  
Experimental results – It is conducted mainly to check stability of MBED OS with respect to 
memory for TrustZone system. It is performed with below implementations with allocated stack sizes 
tabulated on table-4: 
1) Semaphore function - Used 3 threads and 1 Semaphore functions 
2) Mutex function - Used 3 Threads and 1 Mutex functions 
 
Table 4 Stack size of the threads 
Thread Name Assumed stack size 
Thread_1 256 Bytes 
Thread_2 128 Bytes 
Thread_3 200 Bytes (Default) 
Parameters MBED OS – Memory 
Code Size < 4 KBytes 
RAM space for Kernel < 300 Bytes + 128 Bytes 
User Stack 
RAM space for Task 52 Bytes + TaskStackSize 
RAM space for Semaphore 8 Bytes 
RAM space for Mutex 12 Bytes 
RAM space for user timer 8 Bytes 
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3.3.1 Thread Analysis on Cortex M4 and Cortex M33 
 
Figure 23 Thread Analysis on Cortex M4  
An operating system – MBED offers services to both the users and programs to execute, which 
follows sequences of operation known as process, which requires certain resources adopting CPU 
time, memory, files and input and output devices to complete a specific task. Main memory also 
known as Program memory is responsible for accessing the data quicker, which is shared by CPU. 
This program or main memory consists of following memories:  
a) Code Memory – This is mainly dependent on program coding that is viewed on-chip as ROM 
or EPROM. This code memory can also be saved fully off-chip in external ROM. It can be 
observed that flash RAM can also be used to saving a program. 
b) Read only data Memory – When the required program code or data is written onto ROM 
memory, it can’t be eliminated and can be viewed or read only. Compared to RAM memory, 
ROM restores its contents even though hardware is switched off. Thus, RAM is volatile, 
whereas ROM is non-volatile memory. 
c) Read write data Memory – It is type of memory that is basically written into chip as well as 
read from it, which is normally linked with running software and not requiring physical 
processes unlike ROM memory. Thus, RAM is often referred to as Read write memory. 
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Without Thread 
MBED OS operating systems are initially performed without threads. RTX 5 kernel on MBED 
OS that is no longer available when there is no thread, so the system does not interface until the main 
reached. Once it reaches, the hardware will initialize and starts the kernel. The kernel will initialize 
when the main execute. The types of memory without thread consume memory size based on the 
defined kernel configuration.  
1. To calculate used ROM space adding code memory, RO data and RW data, the results are 
obtained.  
2. To calculate used RAM space adding RW data and ZI data, the results are obtained.  
 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage without Thread:  
• ROM = 4808+496+176 = 5480 Bytes   
• RAM = 176+9520 = 9696 Bytes 
With one Thread 
Thread mainly refers to performing scheduled tasks sequentially which is contained within a 
process and various threads created on same process or operation share memory, which is described 
on calculation. It is to note that thread, which is basic unit of CPU utilization contains PC (Program 
Counter), stack, registers with corresponding thread ID for checking which thread is performing 
allotted task or operation. Additionally, on multiprocessor or multicore, threads designed on RTX-5 
kernel for MBED OS has a functionality of running at same time, thus saving the execution time. 
Threads has two types, which are user threads and idle thread designated within kernel itself. It is to 
view that if kernel is single thread, the user thread handling blocked threads will affects entire process 
to block, where the idle thread plays its role of performing the remaining task. However rather than 
having single thread of handling various process, it is essential to increase the number of threads for 
handling multitasks and thereby saving execution time, which is tested on experimental results 
discussed on next section. The types of memories are obtained by using one thread function in MBED 
OS. 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread:  
• ROM = 5128+496+224 = 5848 Bytes 
• RAM = 224+9496 = 9720 Bytes 
By comparing with and without thread the memory consumptions of the operating systems are 
approximately same. The thread function that reduce the processing time in an operating system 
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With one Thread and Semaphore 
As stated earlier on section 2.4.2 regarding functionality of Semaphore defined within 
CMSIS-RTOS2 is mainly used for secured variables which adopts shared resources on multi-
processing environment. It can be noted that semaphore functions don’t operate without thread 
functionality. Semaphore acquire and release values by using thread. 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread and one Semaphore: 
• ROM = 5884+496+248 = 6628 Bytes 
• RAM = 248+9520 = 9768 Bytes 
With one Thread and Mutex 
It was described previously on section 2.4.3 that mutex defined within CMSIS-RTOS2 is a 
program object which allows multiple threads to share resources but not simultaneously. It creates 
resource with unique name.   
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread and one Mutex: 
• ROM = 5832+528+248 = 6608 Bytes 
• RAM = 248+9528 = 9776 Bytes 
By comparing thread with semaphore and mutex the memory consumptions of MBED operating 
system consume the values which are predefined in table 4. 
 
Figure 24 Thread Analysis on Cortex M33 
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Cortex M33 is the developer of Cortex M4 processor. Both are having same properties but 
Cortex M33 has different register address and have secure gate through Trustzone. The initial same 
testing also done on Cortex M33 which is same as M4. Thus, we calculate consumed ROM and RAM 
memory in M33 using different memory types. 
Without Thread 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage without Thread:  
• ROM = 5148+860+176 = 6184 Bytes 
• RAM = 176+9520 = 9696 Bytes 
With one Thread 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread:  
• ROM = 5468+860+224 = 6552 Bytes 
• RAM = 224+9496 = 9720 Bytes 
With one Thread and Semaphore 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread and one Semaphore: 
• ROM = 6224+860+248 = 7332 Bytes 
• RAM = 248+9520 = 9768 Bytes 
With one Thread and Mutex 
MBED OS ROM & RAM usage with one Thread and one Mutex: 
• ROM = 6172+892+248 = 7312 Bytes 
• RAM = 248+9560 = 9808 Bytes 
3.3.2 Experimental results on Cortex M4 and Cortex M33 
As described earlier that with use of single thread, it is unable to handle multitasks and it takes 
more time to execute, where more memory will be consumed, hence the experimental results were 
carried out for multitasking by increasing the number of threads and other functions within CMSIS-
RTOS2 stated on section 3.5. This is mainly done to investigate the memory consumptions on both 
ARM cortex M4 and M33 processors. 
Thus, the threads are increased by allocating different stack sizes and giving different priority 
for each thread, so that each thread performs its own operation on priority basis and simultaneously 
the memory consumed by each thread and release and acquire operations of Semaphore and Mutex 
functions are noted, which is tabulated on Thread Management table on Appendix. The plots are 
correspondingly described on figure 25. 
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Figure 25 Experimental results on Cortex M4 
With 3 Threads and 1 Semaphores  
MBED OS 
ROM = 6536+632+248 = 7416 Bytes  
RAM =248+10424 = 10672 Bytes 
With 3 Threads and 1 Mutexes 
MBED OS 
ROM = 6480+136+248= 6864 Bytes  
RAM =248+10432 = 10680 Bytes 
Final testing on M33 same as M4, memory management in M33 gives the performance analysis of 
operating system. It will decide that which operating system having better function. Core Link SSE 
200 prototyping processor depends on operating system which will be implemented on it. Therefore, 
the memory consumption of M33 should be lower while comparing with others. It will also have 
depicted the operating system. 
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Figure 26 Experimental results on Cortex M33  
With 3 Threads and 1 Semaphores  
MBED OS 
ROM = 6876+996+248 = 8120 Bytes  
RAM = 248+10424 = 10672 Bytes 
With 3 Threads and 1 Mutexes 
MBED OS 
ROM = 6820+1000+248 = 8068 Bytes  
RAM =248+10432 = 10680 Bytes 
Comparing thread analysis and experimental results on Cortex M4 and Cortex M33 
Based on above conducted results it can be observed that thread supports greatly on MBED 
OS for performing multitasks by consuming less memory, which is satisfying the needs of security 
solutions to be fit into TrustZone system. MBED OS supports string functions and has well defined 
libraries, which is main point for having less ROM consumption. Thus, the initial testing on both 
processors performs well. On the final testing of MBED OS, by increasing thread function and 
corresponding thread managements using semaphore and mutex. The RAM consumed by these values 
are higher than the initial values. Because increasing functions in operating system also increase the 
RAM memory. If it is less number of functions means it will consume less memory otherwise it will 
increase. 
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According to the result the memory consumption of MBED OS is moderate and nearly coping with 
ARM Cortex M4, thus it will suitable for Cortex M33 processor to be implement MBED OS together 
with TrustZone on this latest processor which is later integrated into Core Link SSE 200. 
3.3.3 Stack Management on Cortex M33 
The operation of program is done by using semaphore and mutex structures. Kernel 
configured with semaphore and mutex functions, where one thread is defined as default stack size 
200 bytes and remaining threads have specific stack size. The performance based on MBED OS stack 
size and corresponding address are tabulated in the Appendix. The table in the appendix depicts thread 
management using semaphore, mutex which can be observed that each thread has different stack size 
and if certain threads are in ready or blocked mode they will consume same memory in ready and 
blocked mode. But in the running mode it will consume different memory size. It should be noted the 
maximum stack size of each thread and define used size of memory in bytes.  Although stack 
consumption will be performed on Cortex M4, the deciding processor for MBED OS together with 
TrustZone for NB-IoT is ARM cortex M33. Thus, the Stack consumption using thread function of 
semaphore and mutex are shown in figure 27. This is mainly done based on memory consumption 
between ARM Cortex M4 and M33, since the memory consumption plays major role on security 
solutions for protecting the registers with less memory handling. 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Stack consuming using Semaphore and Mutex Functions 
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RTX kernel information 
It gives kernel ID and kernel state. State define that the kernel is in running or ready mode. 
The frequency of kernel is 1000 Hz for all thread managements. Kernel tick count defines the running 
time of kernel. Therefore, the thread objects provide control block size, default size and user stack 
size. Control block size define process table, Task Strut or switch frame in the operating system. The 
semaphore consumes 16 bytes in control block, and mutex consumes 28 bytes. 
  
Figure 28 Kernel Information of semaphore and mutex 
3.3.4 Performance Analysis  
The operating systems executes the program in certain time which is dependent on kernel. 
The main defines with thread having different execution time based on the priority and task on it. The 
thread managements with semaphore and mutex of both MBED OS with each thread timings are 
tabulated in table 5. From the table, we conclude that the running thread takes little bit time comparing 
with other threads. The total execution time is obtained by adding all thread timings.  
Table 5 Thread Execution timings 
Functions Threads Execution time 
on MBED OS 
  
Semaphore 
Thread 1 1.098 sec 
Thread 2 2.083 us 
Thread 3 26.858 ms 
Total execution time (in sec)   1.124 Sec 
  
Mutex 
Thread 1 1.012 us 
Thread 2 2.083 us 
Thread 3 29.087 ms 
Total execution time (in sec)   1.041 sec 
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3.3.5 Trustzone Results 
Based on the MBED OS memory consumption TrustZone will be implemented on Cortex 
M33. It can be noted that memory consumed by different registers on MBED operating system is 
simultaneously secured using TrustZone system. Figure 29 defines secure and non-secure functions 
of the thread which is pointing different regions of memory. The workflow of Trustzone in this 
method has five different functions with callable function. It gives integer data type output values. 
The program is structured with three threads each performing specific operations.  
Function - 1: Non-secure callable function 
Function - 2: Non-secure callable function calling a non-secure callback function [Function - 6]  
Function - 3: Non-secure callable function 
Function - 4: Non-secure callable function calling a non-secure callback function [Function - 6]  
Function - 5: Non-secure callable function calling a non-secure callback function [Function - 6]  
The three different threads contain different functions. They are, 
Thread A – uses value 1 and 2 [Val1_ThreadA and Val2_Thread2] 
Thread B – uses value 3 and 4 [Val3_ThreadB and Val4_ThreadB] 
Thread C – uses value 5 [Val5_ThreadC]. 
Workflow of Trustzone describes, initially the thread is in secure mode when the breakpoint 
is placed at specific value, it changes to non-secure mode. It refers that the non-secure start and to 
perform the operation needed for the specific value which is defined under the thread. For example, 
if the breakpoint is placed in val1_ThreadA the system that switches to non-secure to perform the 
value. Thus, the ThreadA is in running mode and remaining threads are in ready mode. 
Both MBED OS supporting on ARM v8 M architecture. But CMSIS RTOS v2 gives standard 
interface for RTOS running on M33. Thus, MBED OS is the better solution for the Trustzone. The 
RTX 5 runs in non-secure state, but the call functions from the secure state. Memory management of 
Trustzone of secure and non-secure is shown in table 6. 
Table 6 Memory Management in Trustzone 
MEMORY MANAGEMENT 
 SECURE NON-SECURE 
      Code Memory 2432 Bytes 5812 Bytes 
Read Only Data Memory 588 Bytes 968 Bytes 
Read Write Data Memory 8 Bytes 224 Bytes 
Zero Initialized Data Memory 6336 Bytes 11144 Bytes 
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Figure 29 Trustzone Secure and Non-Secure Functions 
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The corresponding values of each thread is shown in figure 30 
 
Figure 30 Thread Values 
Switching between Secure and Non-Secure Modes 
 
Figure 31 Security Transition States 
The processor that handles state transition exchange from Secure Gateway to Non-secure state 
BXNS and the branch with link exchange to BLXNS. Secure gateway (SG) is used for switching 
from Non-secure to Secure state at the first instruction of Secure entry point. Branch with exchange 
to Non-secure state (BXNS) is used by Secure software to branch or return to Non-secure program. 
Branch with link and exchange to Non-secure state (BLXNS) is used by Secure software to call Non-
secure functions. A direct API function call from Non-secure to Secure software entry points is 
allowed if the first instruction of the entry point is SG, and it is in a Non-secure callable memory 
location [17]. The corresponding registers with address in secure and non-secure mode with stack 
where the address in both secure and non-secure modes that protects different regions in system 
memory. It shows that stack point process and limit function with control registers in the states. The 
workflow of Trustzone with breakpoints values and corresponding address and stack size are 
tabulated in Appendix. The table 7 shows how the functions that initially change from non-secure to 
secure state.  
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Table 7 Registers Address Point Corresponding Regions
 
 
Detailed Description state of transition  
When non-secure program calls secure state, that API completes by returning to NS state using 
BXNS instruction. The program in NS attempts to call a secure program address without using entry 
point otherwise it generates fault event. The architecture contains hard fault to handles fault events in 
secure state. The security extension in an architecture that allow a secure program to call non-secure 
state. Therefore, BLXNS instruction is used to call non-secure program.  
The return address and some processor are pushed onto secure stack, while return address on LR 
with a special value known as FNC_RETURN, the address should be zero. The non-secure function 
performing branch address which automatically trigger unstacking of return address from secure stack 
to call function. Secure state selects to transfer some register values to non-secure and clear other data 
from register banks before function call. 
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a. Non-secure Start 
 
Figure 32 Start of Non-secure mode 
b. Switching from non-secure to secure state 
 
Figure 33 Non-secure to secure state 
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Figure 34 Secure to non-secure state  
Table 7 describes the transition state with corresponding addresses. Initially, when the 
breakpoint set to the value. It changes the state from secure to non-secure start, that was shown in 
above figures. thus, the values in non-secure call secure state to execute the function. It is a cyclic 
process that changes from secure to non-secure, some functions are defined with callable function 
which is taken from non-secure itself. The code memory and expansion 0 memory address change 
from non-secure to secure vice versa. The details that contain in secure mode is always protected. But 
in non-secure it needs call function to protect the data. Trustzone that protect whole Core Link SSE 
200 system. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
From the results and discussions, I conclude the project “Investigation of MBED operating system 
with TrustZone as security solutions for a cellular IoT” by the followings. 
1. Operating system plays a major role in Cortex M processors. The Core Link SSE 200 IoT 
subsystem contains two ARM Cortex M33 processors. Based on the operating system the 
device should perform well. On the other side, the operating system needs security purpose to 
secure the memory which contains all the data and registers values. Thus, the processor needs 
better operating system with security solution. In section 1.4 it is clearly explained about the 
reason of choosing MBED OS, it also explains MBED OS with TrustZone security in the next 
section 1.5. Depending on the functionalities of CMSIS RTOS v2 the processors were tested 
using MBED OS in both Cortex M33 and Cortex M4 processors. Based on the performance, 
memory consumption and stack values of both processors, it clearly shows that Cortex M33 
has better solution than Cortex M4 which are proven in section 3.3.  
2. Memory consumption of MBED operating system is done with thread management using 
semaphore and mutex functions. Initially, testing was carried out with and with single thread 
and thread using one semaphore and one mutex. Thus, the kernel is performed better solution 
for memory management. The memory consumption of initial testing values is acceptable 
which are already predefined in kernel functions. Finally, thread management is increased 
based on the user defined application. In this project, final testing is done with 3 threads, 1 
semaphores and 1 mutex function. Even the number of threads can be increased by user, the 
cellular IoT has more operations and functions. So, the number of threads and thread 
managements are increased. Consumption of memory is also increased due to the larger 
number of thread.  
3. On the security side, Trustzone parameters are tested on Cortex M33 processor. Cortex M33 
is only having security layer, whereas it is not in Cortex M4. The main advantage of Trustzone 
is that it protects AHB5 on Core Link SSE 200 IoT subsystem.  It has two modes secure and 
non-secure. Both modes are having same handler and ISR function. From the non-secure point 
of view, the registers are protected within secure state via callable function. The memory 
based calculation on MBED OS are used to protect the register function in the property of 
TrustZone. It will explain the secure and non-secure function of register with corresponding 
memory and address. It clearly shows that how the stack limit is consumed and stack pointer 
in the registers which are mentioned in the section 3.3.5. 
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4. Registers in ARM v8 M architecture are protected by MBED OS based Trustzone function. 
While RTX 5 supports Trustzone without any fails. But in other RTOS it needs some internal 
functions to call secure state. Therefore, Trustzone using MBED OS on Cortex M33 gives 
best solution for cellular IoT.  
Overall, the conclusion of embedded operating system with security solution can be done using 
MBED operating system with Trustzone security on Cortex M33. Therefore, MBED OS supports for 
Core Link SSE 200 IoT subsystem.  
In future scope ARM CORDIO Radio Core IP is to be integrated with Core Link SSE 200 subsystem 
that provides more services and productivity towards the cellular IoT which is referred as Cadelsi 
NB-IoT. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1 Testing Results 
Thread Analysis on Cortex M4    Thread Analysis on Cortex M33 
MBED OS without Thread:         MBED OS without Thread:                             
Code 4808 Bytes 
RO Data 496 Bytes 
RW Data 176 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9520 Bytes 
 
MBED OS with one Thread:    MBED OS with one Thread:    
Code 5128 Bytes 
RO Data 496 Bytes 
RW Data 224 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9496 Bytes 
 
MBED OS with 1 Thread & MBED OS with 1 Thread &  
1 Semaphore:        1 Semaphore:    
  Code 5884 Bytes 
RO Data 496 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9520 Bytes 
 
MBED OS with 1 Thread & 1 Mutex:   MBED OS with 1 Thread & 1 Mutex: 
   
Code 5832 Bytes 
RO Data 528 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9528 Bytes 
 
Experimental Results on Cortex M4  Experimental Results on Cortex M33 
MBED OS with 3 Thread & 1 Semaphore:   MBED OS with 3 Thread & 1 Semaphore:    
Code 6536 Bytes 
RO Data 632 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 10424 Bytes 
 
MBED OS with 3 Thread & 1 Mutex:   MBED OS with 3 Thread & 1 Mutex: 
Code 6480 Bytes 
RO Data 136 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 10432 Bytes 
 
 
 
Code 5148 Bytes 
RO Data 860 Bytes 
RW Data 176 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9520 Bytes 
Code 5468 Bytes 
RO Data 860 Bytes 
RW Data 224 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9496 Bytes 
Code 6224 Bytes 
RO Data 860 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9520 Bytes 
Code 6172 Bytes 
RO Data 892 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 9560 Bytes 
Code 6876 Bytes 
RO Data 996 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 10424 Bytes 
Code 6820 Bytes 
RO Data 1000 Bytes 
RW Data 248 Bytes 
ZI-Data 10432 Bytes 
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MBED OS ON M33 (KERNEL - RTX 5 (CMSIS API v2) [SEMAPHORE] 
Initial Condition Semaphore_1 Max_Count_Token - 3 Initial_Count_Token - 2 
 
Parameters Thread_1 (Use 
Semaphore_1) 
Thread_2 (Use 
Semaphore_2) 
Thread_3 (Use 
Semaphore_2) 
State osThreadRunning osThreadReady osThreadBlocked 
Priority Low Idle High 
Stack Top 
(address) 0x38001640 
 
0x380016A8 
 
0x38001820 
Stack Limit 
(address) 0x38001540 
 
0x38001648 
 
0x38001758 
Stack 
Available 
Stack (used 15% 
Max 28%) 
Stack (used 
75% Max 75%) 
Stack (used 36% 
Max 36%) 
Used:40 Used:72 Used:72 
Max:72 Max:72 Max:72 
Stack Size 256 Bytes 
 
96 Bytes 
 
200 Bytes 
 
Running Condition Semaphore_1 Max_Count_Token - 3 Initial_Count_Token - 3 
 
MBED OS ON M33 (KERNEL - RTX 5 (CMSIS API v2) [MUTEX] 
Parameters Thread_1 (Use 
Mutex_1) 
Thread_2 (Use 
Mutex_2) 
Thread_3 (Use 
Mutex_2) 
State osThreadRunning osThreadReady osThreadBlocked 
Priority Low Idle High 
Stack Top 
(address) 0x38001648 
 
0x380016B0 
 
0x38001828 
Stack Limit 
(address) 0x38001548 
 
0x38001650 
 
0x38001760 
Stack 
Available 
Stack (used 4% 
Max 28%) 
Stack (used 
75% Max 75%) 
Stack (used 36% 
Max 36%) 
Used:10 Used:72 Used:72 
Max:72 Max:72 Max:72 
Stack Size 256 Bytes 
 
96 Bytes 
 
200 Bytes 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
States MUTEX 1 
OS Mutex 
Receive  
True 
OS Mutex 
PrioInherit  
True  
OS Mutex 
Robust  
False 
Owner 
Thread  
Thread 1 
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MBED OS ON M4 (KERNEL - RTX 5 (CMSIS API v2) [SEMAPHORE] 
Initial Condition Semaphore_1 Max_Count_Token - 3 Initial_Count_Token - 2 
 
Parameters Thread_1 (Use 
Semaphore_1) 
Thread_2 (Use 
Semaphore_2) 
Thread_3 (Use 
Semaphore_2) 
State osThreadRunning osThreadReady osThreadBlocked 
Priority Low Idle High 
Stack Top 
(address) 0x20001640 
 
0x200016A8 
 
0x20001820 
Stack Limit 
(address) 0x20001540 
 
0x20001648 
 
0x20001758 
Stack 
Available 
Stack (used 15% 
Max 28%) 
Stack (used 
75% Max 75%) 
Stack (used 36% 
Max 36%) 
Used:40 Used:72 Used:72 
Max:72 Max:72 Max:72 
Stack Size 256 Bytes 
 
96 Bytes 
 
200 Bytes 
 
Running Condition Semaphore_1 Max_Count_Token - 3 Initial_Count_Token - 3 
 
MBED OS ON M4 (KERNEL - RTX 5 (CMSIS API v2) [MUTEX] 
Parameters Thread_1 (Use 
Mutex_1) 
Thread_2 (Use 
Mutex_2) 
Thread_3 (Use 
Mutex_2) 
State osThreadRunning osThreadReady osThreadBlocked 
Priority Low Idle High 
Stack Top 
(address) 0x20001648 
 
0xx200016B0 
 
0x20001828 
Stack Limit 
(address) 0x20001548 
 
0x20001650 
 
0x20001760 
Stack 
Available 
Stack (used 4% 
Max 28%) 
Stack (used 
75% Max 75%) 
Stack (used 36% 
Max 36%) 
Used:10 Used:72 Used:72 
Max:72 Max:72 Max:72 
Stack Size 256 Bytes 
 
96 Bytes 
 
200 Bytes 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States MUTEX 1 
OS Mutex 
Receive  
True 
OS Mutex 
PrioInherit  
True  
OS Mutex 
Robust  
False 
Owner 
Thread  
Thread 1 
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Trustzone 
Table 1: Thread Management (Break point at Value1 / Value2) 
 Thread_A Thread_B Thread_C 
State osThreadRunning osThreadReady osThreadReady 
Priority High Normal Above Normal 
 Stack (used 1% 
Max 12%) 
Stack (used 
50% Max 50%) 
Stack (used 
32% Max 32%) 
Used Used:8 Bytes Used:64 Bytes Used:64 Bytes 
Max Max:64 Bytes Max:64 Bytes Max:64 Bytes 
Top 0x28200360 0x282003E0 0x28201AD0 
Limit 0x28200160 0x28200360 0x28201A08 
Size 512 Bytes 128 Bytes 200 Bytes 
 
Table 2: Thread Management (Break point at Value3 / Value4) 
 Thread_A 
State osThreadRunning 
Priority Low 
 Stack (used 6% 
Max 56%) 
Used Used:8 
Max Max:72 
Top 0x282003E0 
Limit 0x28200360 
Size 128 Bytes 
 
Table 3: Thread Management (Break point at Value5) 
 Thread_B Thread_C 
State osThreadReady osThreadRunning 
Priority Normal Above Normal 
 Stack (used 
56% Max 56%) 
Stack (used 4% 
Max 32%) 
Used Used:64 Bytes Used:8 Bytes 
Max Max:64 Bytes Max:64 Bytes 
Top 0x282003E0 0x28201AD0 
Limit 0x28200360 0x28201A08 
Size 128 Bytes 200 Bytes 
 
 
Note: Stack Configuration (in bytes) - 0x0000 0400  
          Heap Configuration (in bytes) - 0x0000 0C00 
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APPENDIX 2 Main Programs 
Semaphore 
#include "cmsis_os2.h" 
#include “mbed.h”           // mbed  
 
void Thread_Semaphore1 (void *argument);                    // function prototype for thread_1 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Semaphore1;                         // thread id_1 
osSemaphoreId_t sid_Thread_Semaphore1;                      // semaphore id_1 
 
void Thread_Semaphore2 (void *argument);                    // function prototype for thread_2 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Semaphore2;                         // thread id_2 
osSemaphoreId_t sid_Thread_Semaphore2;                      // semaphore id_2 
 
void Thread_Semaphore3 (void *argument);                    // function prototype for thread_3 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Semaphore3;                         // thread id_3 
 
osStatus_t status; 
 
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_1 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Semaphore1 (void *argument)                     // thread function_1 
{ 
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Semaphore1,0x00000004U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_1 
osThreadFlagsWait (0x00000006U, osFlagsWaitAny, 1);         // Wait forever until thread flag 1 is 
set. 
 
 
while (1) { 
tid_Thread_Semaphore1 = osThreadGetId ();  // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Semaphore1, osPriorityLow); // Set thread priority 
   
status = osSemaphoreAcquire (sid_Thread_Semaphore1, 10);    // wait 10 mSec to acquire a 
Semaphore token 
status = osSemaphoreRelease (sid_Thread_Semaphore1);        // Return a token back to a semaphore
  
status = osThreadYield ();                                  // suspend thread 
} 
} 
 
/* -------------- THREAD_1 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Semaphore1_attr = { 
"Thread_Sem1", 
.stack_size = 256 
}; 
 
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_2 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Semaphore2 (void *argument)                     // thread function_2 
{ 
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Semaphore2,0x00000001U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_2 
while (1) {  
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tid_Thread_Semaphore2 = osThreadGetId ();  // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Semaphore2, osPriorityBelowNormal); // Set thread priority 
   
status = osSemaphoreAcquire (sid_Thread_Semaphore2, osWaitForever);    // Wait indefinitely to 
acquire a Semaphore token  
status = osSemaphoreRelease (sid_Thread_Semaphore2);        // Return a token back to a semaphore
  
status = osThreadYield ();                                  // suspend thread 
} 
} 
 
 
/* -------------- THREAD_2 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Semaphore2_attr = { 
"Thread_Sem2", 
.stack_size = 96 
}; 
 
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_3 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Semaphore3 (void *argument)                     // thread function_3 
{ 
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Semaphore3,0x00000003U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_3 
osThreadFlagsWait (0x00000002U, osFlagsWaitAny,  osWaitForever);         // Wait forever until 
thread flag is set. 
 
while (1) { 
tid_Thread_Semaphore3 = osThreadGetId ();  // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Semaphore3, osPriorityHigh); // Set thread priority 
 
osDelay(1); // Pass control to other tasks for 1ms   
status = osSemaphoreAcquire (sid_Thread_Semaphore2, 2);    // wait 2 mSec to acquire a Semaphore 
token  
status = osSemaphoreRelease (sid_Thread_Semaphore2);        // Return a token back to a semaphore
  
status = osThreadYield ();                                  // suspend thread 
} 
} 
/* -------------- THREAD_3 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Semaphore3_attr = { 
"Thread_Sem3", 
.stack_size = 200 
}; 
/* ---------- SEMAPHORE STRUCTURE-------------- */ 
const osSemaphoreAttr_t Thread1_semaphore_attr = { 
  "Semaphore1",                          // human readable semaphore name 
  }; 
 
const osSemaphoreAttr_t Thread2_semaphore_attr = { 
  "Semaphore2",                          // human readable semaphore name 
  }; 
int main(void) { 
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// System Initialization 
//SystemCoreClockUpdate(); 
   
if(osKernelGetState() == osKernelInactive) { 
status=osKernelInitialize();  
} 
 
sid_Thread_Semaphore1 = osSemaphoreNew(4, 2, &Thread1_semaphore_attr); 
if (!sid_Thread_Semaphore1) { 
; // Semaphore object not created, handle failure  
} 
  
sid_Thread_Semaphore2 = osSemaphoreNew(5, 3, &Thread2_semaphore_attr); 
if (!sid_Thread_Semaphore2) { 
; // Semaphore object not created, handle failure 
} 
tid_Thread_Semaphore1 = osThreadNew (Thread_Semaphore1, NULL, &Thread_Semaphore1_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Semaphore1) { 
return(-1); 
} 
 tid_Thread_Semaphore2 = osThreadNew (Thread_Semaphore2, NULL, 
&Thread_Semaphore2_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Semaphore2) { 
return(-1); 
} 
tid_Thread_Semaphore3 = osThreadNew (Thread_Semaphore3, NULL, &Thread_Semaphore3_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Semaphore3) { 
return(-1); 
}  
if (osKernelGetState() == osKernelReady) {  
status=osKernelStart();                      // Start thread execution 
} 
for (;;) {} 
} 
 
Mutex 
#include "cmsis_os2.h" 
#include “mbed.h”           // mbed  
 
void Thread_Mutex1 (void *argument);                    // thread function 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Mutex1;                         // thread id 
osMutexId_t mutex1_id;                                  // Mutex id 
 
void Thread_Mutex2 (void *argument);                    // thread function 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Mutex2;                         // thread id 
osMutexId_t mutex2_id;                                  // Mutex id 
 
 
void Thread_Mutex3 (void *argument);                    // thread function 
osThreadId_t tid_Thread_Mutex3;                         // thread id 
osMutexId_t mutex3_id;                                  // Mutex id 
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osStatus_t status; 
 
 
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_1 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Mutex1 (void *argument) 
{ 
  
  
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Mutex1,0x00000004U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_1 
osThreadFlagsWait (0x00000006U, osFlagsWaitAny, 1);     // Wait forever until thread flag 1 is set. 
while (1) { 
  
tid_Thread_Mutex1 = osThreadGetId ();                   // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Mutex1, osPriorityLow); // Set thread priority 
status = osMutexAcquire(mutex1_id, 10);                 // Waits 10ms for a mutex object specified by 
parameter mutex_id becomes available 
status = osMutexRelease(mutex1_id);                    //  Releases a mutex specified by parameter 
mutex_id. 
status=osThreadYield ();                              //  Suspend thread 
  } 
} 
 
/* -------------- THREAD_1 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Mutex1_attr = { 
 "Thread_Mutex1", 
 .stack_size = 256 
 }; 
/* ----------- Mutex-1 Structure --------------- */ 
const osMutexAttr_t Thread_Mutex1a_attr = { 
  "myThreadMutex1",                          // human readable mutex name 
  osMutexRecursive | osMutexPrioInherit,    // attr_bits 
  NULL,                                     // memory for control block    
  NULL                                      // size for control block 
  }; 
   
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_2 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Mutex2 (void *argument) 
{ 
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Mutex2,0x00000001U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_2 
while (1) { 
  
tid_Thread_Mutex2 = osThreadGetId ();                   // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Mutex2, osPriorityIdle); // Set thread priority 
status  = osMutexAcquire(mutex2_id, osWaitForever);     // Waits until a mutex object specified by 
parameter mutex_id becomes available 
status = osMutexRelease(mutex2_id);                    //  Releases a mutex specified by parameter 
mutex_id. 
status=osThreadYield ();                               // suspend thread 
} 
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} 
 
/* -------------- THREAD_2 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Mutex2_attr = { 
 "Thread_Mutex2", 
 .stack_size = 96  
 }; 
 
/* ----------- Mutex-2 Structure --------------- */ 
const osMutexAttr_t Thread_Mutex2a_attr = { 
  "myThreadMutex2",                          // human readable mutex name 
  osMutexRecursive | osMutexRobust,    // attr_bits 
  NULL,                                     // memory for control block    
  NULL                                      // size for control block 
  }; 
 
/* ----------- THREAD_FUNCTION_3 --------------- */ 
void Thread_Mutex3 (void *argument)                     // thread function_3 
{ 
osThreadFlagsSet(tid_Thread_Mutex3,0x00000003U);        // Sets the thread flags for a thread 
specified by parameter thread_3 
osThreadFlagsWait (0x00000002U, osFlagsWaitAny,  osWaitForever);  // Wait forever until thread 
flag is set. 
 
while (1) { 
tid_Thread_Mutex3 = osThreadGetId ();  // Obtain ID of current running thread 
osThreadSetPriority (tid_Thread_Mutex3, osPriorityHigh); // Set thread priority 
 
osDelay(1); // Pass control to other tasks for 1ms   
status  = osMutexAcquire(mutex2_id, 2);                 // Waits 2ms for a mutex object specified by 
parameter mutex_id becomes available 
status = osMutexRelease(mutex2_id);                    //  Releases a mutex specified by parameter 
mutex_id. 
status = osThreadYield ();                             // suspend thread 
} 
} 
 
/* -------------- THREAD_3 STRUCTURE----------------- */ 
 
const osThreadAttr_t Thread_Mutex3_attr = { 
 "Thread_Mutex3", 
 .stack_size = 200 
 }; 
 
int main(void) { 
 
// System Initialization 
//SystemCoreClockUpdate(); 
   
if(osKernelGetState() == osKernelInactive) { 
status=osKernelInitialize();  
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} 
 
mutex1_id = osMutexNew(&Thread_Mutex1a_attr); 
if (mutex1_id != NULL)  { 
// Mutex object created 
}  
mutex2_id = osMutexNew(&Thread_Mutex2a_attr); 
if (mutex2_id != NULL)  { 
// Mutex object created 
}  
mutex3_id = osMutexNew(&Thread_Mutex3a_attr); 
if (mutex3_id != NULL)  { 
// Mutex object created 
} 
 
tid_Thread_Mutex1 = osThreadNew (Thread_Mutex1, NULL, &Thread_Mutex1_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Mutex1) { 
return(-1); 
} 
tid_Thread_Mutex2 = osThreadNew (Thread_Mutex2, NULL, &Thread_Mutex2_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Mutex2) { 
return(-1); 
} 
tid_Thread_Mutex3 = osThreadNew (Thread_Mutex3, NULL, &Thread_Mutex3_attr); 
if (!tid_Thread_Mutex3) { 
return(-1); 
} 
if (osKernelGetState() == osKernelReady) {  
status=osKernelStart();                      // Start thread execution 
} 
for (;;) {} 
} 
 
Trustzone  
Secure Program 
#include <arm_cmse.h> 
  
#include "RTE_Components.h" 
#include CMSIS_device_header 
  
/* TZ_START_NS: Start address of non-secure application */ 
#ifndef TZ_START_NS 
#define TZ_START_NS (0x200000U) 
#endif 
  
/* typedef for non-secure callback functions */ 
typedef void (*funcptr_void) (void) __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)); 
  
/* Secure main() */ 
int main(void) { 
  funcptr_void NonSecure_ResetHandler; 
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  /* Add user setup code for secure part here*/ 
  
  /* Set non-secure main stack (MSP_NS) */ 
  __TZ_set_MSP_NS(*((uint32_t *)(TZ_START_NS))); 
  
  /* Get non-secure reset handler */ 
  NonSecure_ResetHandler = (funcptr_void)(*((uint32_t *)((TZ_START_NS) + 4U))); 
  
  /* Start non-secure state software application */ 
  NonSecure_ResetHandler(); 
  
  /* Non-secure software does not return, this code is not executed */ 
  while (1) { 
    __NOP(); 
  } 
} 
 
Non-secure Program 
#include "cmsis_os2.h" 
#include "mbed.h" 
#include "interface.h" 
#include <stdio.h> 
extern volatile int val1, val2, val3, val4, val5; 
volatile int val1, val2, val3, val4, val5; 
 
void ThreadA (void *argument);                     
static osThreadId_t tid_ThreadA;                          
 
void ThreadB (void *argument);                    
static osThreadId_t tid_ThreadB; 
 
void ThreadC (void *argument);                    
static osThreadId_t tid_ThreadC; 
 
static osStatus_t status; 
 
int func6(int x); 
 
int func6(int x) { 
 return (x+6); 
} 
 
void ThreadA (void *argument){ 
 
 tid_ThreadA = osThreadGetId(); 
 status = osThreadSetPriority(tid_ThreadA, osPriorityHigh); 
  
 val1 = func1 (1); 
 val2 = func2 (func6, val1); 
  
  status=osThreadYield ( ) ; 
} 
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void ThreadB (void *argument){ 
 
 tid_ThreadB = osThreadGetId(); 
 status = osThreadSetPriority(tid_ThreadB, osPriorityLow); 
 val3 = func3 (val1, val2); 
 val4 = func4 (func6); 
 status=osThreadYield ( ) ; 
} 
 
void ThreadC (void *argument){ 
 
 tid_ThreadC = osThreadGetId(); 
 status = osThreadSetPriority(tid_ThreadC, osPriorityAboveNormal); 
 val5 = func5 (4, func6); 
 status=osThreadYield ( ) ; 
} 
 
static uint64_t Thread_1_stk_1[64]; 
 
static const osThreadAttr_t Thread_1_attr = { 
   .tz_module = 1U, 
  .stack_mem  = &Thread_1_stk_1[0], 
  .stack_size = sizeof(Thread_1_stk_1) 
}; 
 
static uint32_t Thread_2_stk_1[32]; 
 
static const osThreadAttr_t Thread_2_attr = { 
   .tz_module = 1U, 
  .stack_mem  = &Thread_2_stk_1[0], 
  .stack_size = sizeof(Thread_2_stk_1) 
}; 
 
 
 
static const osThreadAttr_t Thread_3_attr = { 
   .tz_module = 1U, 
   .stack_size = 0 
}; 
 
 
int main(void) { 
   
if(osKernelGetState() == osKernelInactive) { 
status=osKernelInitialize();  
} 
    
 tid_ThreadA = osThreadNew(ThreadA, NULL, &Thread_1_attr); 
   
  tid_ThreadB = osThreadNew(ThreadB, NULL, &Thread_2_attr); 
 tid_ThreadC = osThreadNew(ThreadC, NULL, &Thread_3_attr); 
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if (osKernelGetState() == osKernelReady) {  
status=osKernelStart();                      
} 
for (;;) {} 
} 
 
Interface.c 
#include <arm_cmse.h>     // CMSE definitions 
#include "interface.h"    // Header file with secure interface API 
 
/* typedef for non-secure callback functions */ 
typedef funcptr funcptr_NS __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)); 
 
/* Non-secure callable (entry) function */ 
int func1(int x) __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) {  
  return x+4;  
} 
 
/* Non-secure callable (entry) function, calling a non-secure callback function */ 
int func2(funcptr callbackA, int x)  __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) { 
 funcptr_NS callbackA_NS;               // non-secure callback function pointer 
 int y; 
  
 /* return function pointer with cleared LSB */ 
  callbackA_NS = (funcptr_NS)cmse_nsfptr_create(callbackA); 
  
 y = callbackA_NS (x+7); 
  
 return (y+2); 
} 
/* Non-secure callable (entry) function */ 
int func3(int x, int y) __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) { 
 return (x+y); 
} 
 
/* Non-secure callable (entry) function, calling a non-secure callback function */ 
int func4(funcptr callbackB) __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) { 
 funcptr_NS callbackB_NS;         // non-
secure callback function pointer 
 int y; 
  
  
 /* return function pointer with cleared LSB */ 
  callbackB_NS = (funcptr_NS)cmse_nsfptr_create(callbackB); 
  
 y = callbackB_NS(3); 
  
 return y; 
} 
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/* Non-secure callable (entry) function, calling a non-secure callback function */ 
int func5(int x,funcptr callbackC) __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) { 
 funcptr_NS callbackC_NS; 
 int y; 
 
 /* return function pointer with cleared LSB */ 
  callbackC_NS = (funcptr_NS)cmse_nsfptr_create(callbackC); 
 
  y = callbackC_NS (x+5); 
  
 return (2+y); 
} 
 
 
 
 
